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action. Petitioner SIPC asserts that it is. 
CA 6 implied a congressional intent to 
private enforcement of the SIPC obligation 
right to sue and be sued in its own name. 
General has filed a memorandum on behalf of t 
and Exchange Commission, a named - which he 6 ruling is erroneous but states t~at 
the SEC's experience with the Act is insufficient to enable ~~~ 
it to express an opinion whether the error is sufficiently ~ ~~­
important to the administration of the Act~war~ the 
grant of certiora~. 
___./ 
2. Facts: The Security Investor Protection Act, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 78 aaa et ~· was enacted to protect customers _ _____.. 
of securities brokers and dealers. The Act r~flected 
·--=------------ --------
congressional fears that the certain brokers and dealers 
might fail and thereby jeopardize the cash and securities 
their customers had left in their charge. The Act established 
the Security Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), a non-profit 
corporation with a membership consisting of brokers, dealers, 
and .members of the national exchanges. 
In addition to consulting and counseling respon~ibilities, 
the Act charges SIPC with the responsibility of acting to 
save customer's assets in cases in which a member's insolvency 
appears imminent. Section 78 eee(a) (1) of the Act require s 





report to SIPC whenever it believes that an 
SIPC member is in financial difficulty or is approaching 
that state. The Act authorizes SIPC to seek a judicial 
decree that the customers of its members are in need of the 
Act's protection and empowers the court, upon a proper 
- -
finding, to app? int a tr~ for liquidation of the member's 
business and distribution of its assets. See id. §78 eee(b). · 
Finally, if liquidation is ordered the Act provides that SIPC 
must advance to the trustee sufficient sums to enable him 
to satisfy customers' claims not exceeding $50,000. Id. 
§ 78 fff(f). 
The Act vests initial responsibility for seeking 
liquidation in the SIPC. Upon a determination of the 
e~istence of certain specified conditions and an SIPC finding 
that the member "has failed or is in danger of failing to 
meet its obligations to its customers" the SIPC "may" 
commence liquidation proceedings. This broad discretion 
is limited by Section 78 ggg, which authorizes the Securities 
1. Self-regulatory organizations presently include 
the national securities exchanges and the National AsS'n. 
of Securities Dealers. 
4. 
and Exchange Commission to apply to the district court 
for an order requiring the SIPC to discharge its obligations 
under the Act. 
Respondent Barbour is the trustee for Guarantee Bond 
and Securities Corporation (Guarantee Bond), a broker-dealer 
registered with the SEC. In December of 1970, only a few ------days before the effective date of the Securities Investor 
Protection Act, the SE~ filed a complaint alleging substantial 
violations of the SEC net capital rule and requesting a 
preliminary injunction against further violations. In 
Janu~ry of the following year, a few days after the effective 
date of the Act, the district court found Guarantee Bond to 
have been in violation of Commission rule and -issued a /··------.---------
preliminary injunction against further violations. On -motion of the SEC, the court appointed a receiver for 
~ ,-, .. 
Guarantee Bond . ._.,., ,., .., 
The appointed receiver, after having completed part 
of the liquidation, filed a petition in the district court 
asking that SIPC and the SEC be ordered to show cause why 
the SIPC should not be required to extend the protections 
of the Act to the customers of the insolvent firm. The 
court issued the requested order. 
The district court concluded that it had in personam 
and subject matter jurisdiction and that respondent had 
standing to institute an action to compel the SIPC to discharge 
( 
5 . 
its statutory obligations in this case. The Court concluded, 
however, that application of the Act to this case would 
amount to retroactive extension of an Act designed to apply 
only prospectively. 
CA 6 affirmed the district court's rulings on standing 
and jurisdiction, but reversed the determination that the 
Act could not be applied to the facts of this case. While 
conceding that applying the Act to bankruptcies occurring 
prior to its ·effective date would violate the clear congressional 
intent only to offer the Act's protections prospectively, 
CA 6 concluded that the facts of this case indicated that 
the Act should apply. CA 6 noted that the SEC's initial 
.,'ll...-;· ·~ .. ·•· .... 
complaint against Guarantee Bond, which preceded the --
effective date of the Act, did not include a request that 
Guarantee be forced into receivership. Thus, the original -------- ..______ ~ ---- -
SEC action did not prevent Guarantee from operating and 
conducting normal business after the effective date of the 
Act. In the opinion of CA 6, the conduct of business after 
the effective date of the Act made Guarantee Bond a "broker" 
within the meaning of the Act. Thus, the customers of 
Guarantee were covered by the SIPA. 
3. Contentions: Although ~ raises five questions 
for this Court's consideration, it only arg~es three. The 
remaining two are stated for the purpose of saving them in 
6. 
the event the writ is granted. 
2 
The first point raised and discussed is that CA 6 
misconstrued Section 7(b) of SIPA when it determined that 
it grants a P,rivate cause of action to compel SIPC to 
discharge its obl~gations under the Act. This is the point 
that petitioner advances most forcefully. 
Petitioner additionally asserts that the lower courts . 
erred in determining that SIPC should be compelled to 
initiate liquidation proceedings under the Act in an 
instance in which the broker-dealer already has been 
substantially liquidated; where there is no demonstration 
that the customers will suffer any loss; and where it is 
impossible to implement the Act in the manner intended by 
Congr~ss. 
Petitioner's third major point is that the courts 
erred in concluding that the Tennessee long arm statute 
authorized the assertion of in personam jurisdiction 
over the SIPC. Petitioner asserts that this application 
of the statute violates the due process "minimum contacts" 
requirement established by a number of decisions of this 
2. The points raised but not discussed are whether, 
assuming a private right to action can be implied under the 
stat~te, a Receiver in Bankruptcy has standing to protect 
the ~nterests of the customers, and a retroactivity point that 
a dealer hopelessly insolvent prior to the effective date of 
the Act is not covered by its provisions. As part of this 
latter point, petitioner asserts that it was denied due process 
when CA 6 held that the Act applies without requiring a: , · . · 
hearing on the evidentiary question of whether Guarantee conducted 
normal business after the effective date of the Act. 
7 • 
Court. See~·~·, Hanson v. Kenckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); 
Intnl . . Shoe, 326 U.S. 310. Petitioner indicates that its 
sole offices are in Washington, D. C. and that it does not 
engage in activities, substantial or otherwise in the forum 
state. 
4. Discussion: Standing alone, two of petitioners' 
three major points are not certworthy. The question of in 
personam jurisdiction is largely a factual determination. 
The district court ruling, affirmed without discussion by 
CA 6, was that SIPC had established a continuing relationship 
with members and customers in the State of Tennessee. The 
court concluded that the Act plainly provides that the SIPC 
will impose assessments on members, collect those assessments 
through a collection agent, and extend protection to customers 
and members within the State. That provided the continuing 
relationship with the forum $tate. 
3 not appear certworthy. 
This determination does 1 c~~ 
__:..-...--
3. Respondent Barbour, the Receiver in Bankruptcy, has 
asserted that petitioner waived objection to the Court's in 
personam jurisdiction. That appears to represent a misinterpretation 
of the record. The district court considered the request to require 
SIPC to discharge its statutory obligations to be an ancillary 
question to the administration of the receivership. This apparently 
created some confusion about whether the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure would apply. Petitioner, more concerned with other 
matters, offered to submit itself to the court's jurisdiction 
if the court would agree to conduct all proceedings in accordance 
With the Federal Rules. Petitioner's offer, contained in its reply 
brief, was clearly conditional in nature. Seen. 2 of Petitioner's 
reply brief. More ~mportant, the offer was reject ed; the district 
court ignored petitioner's conditional offer and considered the in 
personam jurisdiction question on the merits. CA 6 affirmed on tEe 







Court~ See~·~·, Hanson v. Kenckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); 
Intnl . . Shoe, 326 U.S. 310. Petitioner indicates that its 
sole offices are in Washington, D. C. and that it does not 
engage in activities, substantial or otherwise in the forum 
state. 
4. Discussion: Standing alone, two of petitioners' 
three major points are not certworthy. The question of in 
personam jurisdiction is largely a factual determination. 
The district court ruling, affirmed without discussion by 
CA 6, was that SIPC had established a continuing relationship 
with members and customers in the State of Tennessee. The 
court concluded that the Act plainly provides that the SIPC 
will impose assessments on members, collect those assessments 
through a collection agent, and extend protection to customers 
and members within the State. That provided the continuing 
relationship with the forum state. 
3 not appear certworthy. 
This determination does 
3. Respondent Barbour, the Receiver in Bankruptcy, has 
asserted that petitioner waived objection to the Court's in 
personam jurisdiction. That appears to represent a misinterpretation 
of the record. The district court considered the request to require 
SIPC to discharge its statutory obligations to be an ancillary 
question to the administration of the receivership. This apparently 
created some confusion about whether the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure would apply. Petitioner, more concerned with other 
matters, offered to submit itself to the court's jurisdiction 
if the court would agree to conduct all proceedings in accordance 
With the Federal Rules. Petitioner's offer, contained in its reply 
brief, was clearly conditional in nature. Seen. 2 of Petitioner's 
reply brief. More ~mportant, the offer was reject ed; the district 
court ignored petitioner's conditional offer and considered the in 
personam jurisdiction question on the merits. CA 6 affirmed on tne 
merits, not mentioning waiver. 
Petitioner's point that application of the Act to a 
liquidation that was substantially completed at the time 
of interjection of the SIPC is an isolated ruling that is 
not likely to have major importance to the adrninis.tration 
8. 
of the Act. Essentially, petitioner urges that the facts 
of this case were such that the statutory purpose could not 
be achieved by extending SIPC protection to these customers. 
This point is not certworthy by itself. 
The point most stressed by petitioner, that the Act 
does not afford a private cause of action to compel SIPC 
- _!.. !£@_-
to discharge its statutory obligations, is an issue that 
,---
appears to have more significant implications to the . - -------------------
administration of the SIPA. The Act specifies certain 
' 
conditions that SIPC must find before deciding to request 
that a court decree that the member's customers are in 
need of the Act's protections. Even when the conditions are 
satisfied, the Act vests discretion in SIPC to determine 
whether to request that the court adjudicate the customers 
in need of the Act's protections, and thus force liquidation. 
The Act provides that the SIPC discretion can be policed 
by the SEC~ It affords the SEC the rightto override the 
__.---..) - ------
SIPC judgment by bringing an injunction action to compel 
' \ 
the SIPC to commence a liquidation proceeding. 
The A~us ·contemplates ~dual exercise of discretio~ 
First, the SIPC has discretion to decide whether to seek to 
9. 
have a court initiate a liquidation proceeding and extend 
the protections of the Act to a broker-dealer's customers. 
Second, assuming an SIPC decision not to extend coverage 
in a given case, th~t provides the SEC the power to 
initiate proceedings to ~ompel the SIPC to act. The J j
SIPA is silent ·on the question of a private right of V'~ 
action on this question. 
The CA 6 decision that a private right o:E action does 
exist to compel SIPC action rests on two factors: (1) that 
~
the Act recognizes that the SIPC can sue and be sued in its 
own name; and (2) that the Act does not specifically prohibit 
a private suit to compel SIPC action on this matter. These 
fa~tors persuaded CA 6 that the Act should not be construed 
to foreclose private litigation on the question of the SIPC's 
discharge of its statutory obligation to customers in a 
particular· instance. 
Petitioner primarily relies on the recent decision 
in National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. 
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974) to establish that the CA 6 
statutory interpretation is erroneous. In National RR 
Passenger Corp. the Court refused to imply a general private 
right of action in the Amtrak Act, concluding that the broad 
provisions of the statute created a "public cause of action" 
that could only be enforced by the Attorney General. Id. at 457. 
... 
10. 
National Passenger is largely a question of interpretation 
of the Amtrack Act. However, the case does indicate on a more 
- ::::= 
general level that courts should be reluctant to imply private 
causes of action in some complex federal regulatory matters 
where the existence of such an action would seriously disrupt 
the balance between .the regulatee and the federal agency 
charged with an oversight function. The general structure 
of the SIPA strongly suggests the correctness of the SIPC 
assertion that the decision whether to force liquidation 
and extend the Act's protections to a group of customers is 
one committed to the pyramided discretions of the SIPC and 
the SEC.. It is hard to deterrn.ine exactly how a private 
cause of action would fit into this scheme. 
The SG, on behalf of respondent SEC, has conceded 
that CA 6 erred on this point. The SG asserts, however, 
that the Act is too new to enable him or the SEC to express 
an opinion whether the error below is of sufficient importance 
to merit the grant of certiorari. 
The SG's timidity is somewhat surprising. If followed 
in other courts, the CA 6 ruling would appear to have significant 
consequences on the overall administration of SIPA. And, as 
the SIPC has pointed out, the pres ent market situation is 
sufficiently gloomy to suggest that actions of this kind might 
recur with some frequency. 
There are responses by both respondents and petitioner 
has filed a reply. 
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BOBTAIL MEMO JDUM 
To: Justice Powell 
From: David Re: No.73-2055 Securities 
Investor Protect1on Corp. 
v. Barbour, et. al 
In my view, this is a rather easy case. I think that 
a private cause of action is inconsistent with the framework 
of the Securities Investor Protection Act. I therefore recommend 
that you vote to reverse the decision of the Sixth Circuit 
authorizing such an action. This disposition makes it unnecessary 
to reach the standing issue on which certiorari also was 
granted. 
If nothing else, the law governing the question of 
determining whether a private cause of action should be implied 
is extremely pragmatic. As Justice Stewart wrote in National R.R . 
Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers, 
414 u.s. 453, 458 (1974): 
[T]he inference of such a private cause of action 
not otherwise authorized by the statute must be 
consistent with the evident legislative intent 
and, of course, with the effectuation of the purposes 
intended to be served by the Act. 
Thus, the basic analysis required is a careful examination of 
the statute allegedly sought to be enforced to determine whether 
private enforcement via judicial action would serve to further 
the legislative purpose in enacting the statute. Thus, for 
example, in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,377 U.S. 426, the opinion 
generally considered to be the father of the notion of an implied 
private cauae of action to enforce a regulatory statute, the 
• ... 2. 
Court premised the implied cause of action on the determination 
that such an action would provide a "necessary supplement" to 
SEC action and that judicial provision of a private action would 
afford a ''most effective weapon" for enforcing the Securities 
and Exchange Act's proxy requirements. Id., at 432. In the 
Amtrak case (National R.R. Passenger Corp.), on the other hand, 
a determination that a private action would disrupt rather than 
promote the Act's implementation dictated a conclusion that such 
an action would not be provided. 
In this case it appears that an implied private right of 
action would be inconsistent with the careful balance of 
discretion established by the relationship between the Securities 
Investor Protection Corp. and the SEC. Obviously Congress did 
noc contemplate that the protections of the Act would automatic-
ally be extended to every group of investors that might suffer 
Losses resulting from insolvency of a member of the securities 
industry. Thus, the Act vests significant discretion in the 
Securities Investor Protection Corporation, stating that 
"[i]f SIPC determines"that the statutory conditions are satisfied 
it "may apply •.• for a decree adjudicating that customers 
of such member are in need of the protection provided by this 
chapter." 15 u.s.c. § 78ggg(b). Moreover, the Act establishes 
the SEC as the regulatory body responsible for assuring that 
SIPC exercises its discretion in a responsible manner. Not only 
does the Act provide that the SEC should inform SIPC of facts 
indicating that a member is approaching financial difficulty,id., 
it authorizes the SEC to apply to the district court for a 
decree requiring SIPC to extend the protections of the Act to 
' 
~ . 3. 
cover a particular situation. Significantly, however, the 
Act again vests discretion in the SEC, stating that "[i]n the 
event of the refusal of SIPC to commit its funds or 
otherwise to act for the protection of customers 
Commission may apply to the disttict court •••• " 
. . . the 
Thus, the Act carefully con$tructs a two-tiered level 
of discretionary authority, vested·~ in organizations possessing 
substantial expertise. Implication of a private cause of 
action in individuals probably lacking that expertise seems 
inconsistent with this scheme. Decisions of whether to extend 
the Act's protections in a given situation invariably will 
require a rather sophistocated financial judgment. Additiona~ly, 
it would appear that "inside information" of the kind the 
SEC and the SIPC might normally obtain through their capacities 
as regulatory bodies would be important in reaching a decision. 
Those organizations might, for example, know that a firm was 
about to enter into a merger, obtain a significant 'financial 
boost through loan or divestiture, or take any number of actions 
to improve the financial picture. Not only would premature 
intervention be unnecessary, in some cases it might frustrate 
the very ameliorative processes that are at work. And allowing 
a private party to institute suit and force SIPC to justify its 
decision not to act might prove even more disasterous, requiring 
in some instances that SIPC reveal sensitive information at 
a critical time in order to justify its decision to the courts. 
The other arguments are plentiful, and need not be 
elaborated here. I think this is a clear case, and that the 
decision below should be reversed. 
David 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATiS 
No. 73-2055 
Securities Investor Protection! On Writ of Certiorari to 
Corporation, Petitioner, the United States Court 
v. of Appeals for the Sixth 
James C. Barbour Pt al. Circuit. 
[May -, 1975] 
MR. JusTICE MARSHAL:&.. delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The Securities Investor Protection Corporation 
(SIPC) was established by Congress as a nonprofit mem-
bership corporation for the purpose, inter alia, of pro-
viding financial relief to the customers of failing broker-
dealers with whom they had left cash or securities on 
deposit. The question presented by this case is whether -such customers have an implied private right of action 
under e ecun Ies nvestor rotection Act of 1970 
(SIPA), 1.5 U.S. C.§ 78aaa et seq., to compel SIPC to 
exercise its statutory authority for their 5enefit. -
I 
Tn D{'cember 1970 the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) filed a complaint in District Court against 
Guaranty Bond and Secunties Corporation, a registered 
broker-dealer, to enjoin continued violation of the Com-
mis::~ion's net capital and other rules. On January 6, 
1971, the District Court issued a preliminary inJunction, 1 
and on January 29 it granted the Commission's motion 
for appointment of a receiver to wind up the affairs of, 








2 SECFRITIES INVESTOR PROTECTJON '' · BAHBOUR 
On April 6 respondent. allegmg that customers of 
Guaranty Bond would sustain a loss at least equal to the 
costs of administering the receivership, obtained from 
the court ao order directing the SEC and SIPC to show 
cause "why the remedies afforded by the [SIP A] should 
not be made available in this proceeding." In its answer 
the SEC took the position that respondent had not 
demonstrated that Guaranty's customers would in fact 
sustain any loss since it appeared that the receiver would 
have a cause of action for damages or restitution against 
Guaranty's parent company and principals. .§!f.C, on 
the other hand, challenged the receiver's standing to 
maintain an action to compel its intervention and, in 
direct opposition to the position of the SEC, argued that 
Guaranty s insolvency pnor to the ecember 30, 1970, 
rlate on which the SIPA too effect meant tliat applica-
tion of the Act to this case would g1ve it an unlawful 
retroactive effect. 
The District Court upheld the receiver's right of action, 
but demed relief on the ground that Guaranty's hopeless 
insolvency pnor to the effective date of the SIP A ren-
dered the Act inapplicable. The Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit reversed. Since Guaranty had con-
. -...---~ 
ducted 101 transactions after December 30, and the SEC 
did not move to prevent its carrying on business as a 
broker-dealer until January 6, It held that Guaranty 
qualified as a broker-dealer on th~e 
Act. ' he court en reJecte ~ G's argument that the 
provision for SEC enforcement actwns to compel SIPC 
to perform its functions was meant to be exclusive of 
such actions by protected customers or their representa-
tive, and remanded the case for further proceedings. We 
grauted certiorari, limited to the questions whether cus-
tomers have an 1mplied right of action to compel SIPC 
to act and , if RO, whether a receiver has standing to main-
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the Court of Appeals on the groun~ that no implied 
:right of action exists, we do not ~qdress the second 
question, 
II 
Following a period of great expansion in the 1960s, the 
securities industry experienced a business contraction 
that led to the failure or instability of a sigr).ificant nu.m~ 
ber of brokerage firms. Custom~r!S of fa.iled firms found 
their ca,sh and securities on deposit, either disslpA-ted or 
tied up in lengthy bankruptcy pfOCE:Jedings. In addition 
to its disastrous effects on customer assets and investor 
confidence, this situation also threatened a ''domino ef-
fect" trvolving otherwise solvent brokers that had sub~ 
stantial open tqwsactions with firms that failed. Con-
gress enacted the SIP A to arnest this process, restore 
investor confidence in the capita,J rp.arkets, ~nd upgrade 
the financial responsibility requirem~nts for registered 
brokers and dea1ers. S. Rep, No, 91-12181 91st Cong., 2d 
Sess., 2-4 (1970); H. R: Rep. No. 91-.l613, 91st Cong., 
2d Sess., 2-4 ( 1970), 
The Act apportions responsibility for these tasks 
a.mong the SEC, the securities inqustry self-regula,tory 
organizations, aqd SIPC, a nonprofit, private membership 
co.rpo~ti_~~ to whic1i most registeted brokers and dealers 
are required to belong. 15 U. S. C. § 78ccc. Most im~ 
portant for present purposes, thf:l .A.ct creates a new form 
of liquidation proceeding, applicable only t~r 
fi~plish the 1 c~mpletion of open 
transactions and the speedy return of most customer 
property, 
To this end, SIPC is required to establish and main-
tain a fund for cu tomer protection byTaying assessm~ts 
on tlie annual gross revenues of its members. The SEC 
and the securities mdustry self-reg~latory organizations 
a.re required to notify HIPC whenever it appears that a 
73 ·-2055-0PJNION 
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member is in or ~pproaching· fin~ncial difficulty. If 
SIPC determines that a member has failed or is in qanger 
of failing to meet its obligations to customers, and fi.I1ds 
any one of five srecified conditions suggestive of fin!lncial 
irrespons~bility, tl'ten i~ '(may apply to any court of com~ 
petent jurisdiction ... for a 4ecree adjuclicating that 
customers of such member t=~.re in neeq qf the protectiou 
provided by [th~ Act]." 15 U. S. C. § 78eee (:2). 
The mere filing of an SIPC a}:lplipatjon giyes the court 
in wqich it is filed exclusive jurisdiction over tpe member 
and it~ property, wherever located, 11nd q~quires the court 
to stay "any pending bankruptcy, mortgage foreclosure, 
equity receivership, or other proceeding to reorganize, 
conserve, or liquidate the fmemper] or its property and 
any other suit against any receiver, conservator, or 
trustee of the [member] or its property." 15 U. S. C. 
§ 78eee (b) (2). · If the S.EC has pending any action 
against the member, it ma.y, with the Commi~sion's con-
sent, be combined with the SIPC prqceeqing. If no such 
action is pending, the S.EC may intervene as a party to 
the SIPC proceeding. 
If the court finds any of the five conditions on which 
a SIPC applica.tion may be based, it must grant the ap-
plication and issue the decree, and ,appoint as trustee for 
the liquidation of the business imd as attorney for the 
trustee, "such per~>ons as SIPC shall specify.'' 1.5 U.S. C" 
§ 78eee (b)(l), (3) . 
The trustee is empowered and directed by the Act to 
return customer property, complete open tra11sactions, 
enforce rights of !iJUbrogation, and liquidate tqe business 
of the member, 15 U. S. C. § 78fff (a); he lS not em-
powered to reorganize or rehabilita te the business. SIPC 
is required to advance to him such sums as are necessary 
to complete open transactwns, and to accomplish the 
return of customer property up to a value of $50,000. 
ld" ~ 78fff (f). 
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'rhe role of the SEC m this scheme, insofar as relevant \ 
~
to the present case, is one of "plenary authority" to 
supervise SIPC. S. Rep., supra, at 1; see H. R. Rep, 
supra, at 12. For example, it may disapprove in whole 
or in part any bylaw or rule adopted by the Board of 
Directors of SIPC, or require th~ adoption of any rule 
it deems appropriate, in order to promote the public 
interest and the purposes of the Act. 15 U. S. C. § 78ccc 
(e). It may inspect and examine SIPC's records and 
require that any information it de~ms appropriate be 
furnished to it, and it receives the corporation's annual 
report for inspection and transmission, with 1ts com-
ments, to the President and Congress. 15 U. S. C. 
§ 78ggg (c). It may participate in any liquidation pro-
ceeding initiated by SIPC, but even more important, 
§ 7 (b) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78ggg (b), provides: 
"Enforcement of actions.-In the event of the re-
fusal of SIPC to commit its funds or otherwise to 
act for the protectiOn of customers of any member 
of SIPC, the Commission may apply to the district 
court of the United States in which the principal 
office of SIPC is located for an order requiring SIPC 
to discharge its obligations under [the Act] and for 
such other relief as the court may deem appropriate 
to carry out the purpo:,;es of [the Act J ." 
It is against this background relationship between 
SIPC and the SEC that we must approach the question 
whether, in addition to the Commission, a member's 
cll'Stomers or their rerresentative --miiY seek m District 
~
(~ "to commit its funds or otherwise 
to act for the protection' of such customers. 
III 
The respoudent contends that since the SIP A does not 
in terms preclude a private cause of action at the 
73 2055-0PINTON 
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instance of a member broker's customers, and since such 
customers are the mtended beneficiaries of the Act, the 
Court should imply a right of action by which customers 
can compel SIPC to discharge 1ts oblig~tions to them. 
As we said only htst Term in analyzing a similar conten-
tion, "It goes without saymg . .. thltt the inference of 
such a private cf).use of action not otherwise authorized 
by the statute must be consistent with the evident legis-
lative inteut anq, of course, with the effectuation of the 
purposes mtended to be served by the Act.'' National 
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Rail-
road Passengers, 414 U. S. 453 (1974) (hereinafter 
Arntrak). 
In Arntrak itself t.he petitioner was a corporatio11 
created by Congress to assume from private railroads 
certain intercity rail passenger service responsibilities. 
The respondent passenger association brought an action 
to enjoin the discontinuance ' of a particular service as 
announced by the corporation pursuant to its authority 
under the Rail Passenger Service (Amtrak) Act, 45 
U. S. C. § 564 (b)(2). That Act made express provision 
for suits against Amtrak to enforce its duties and obli-
gations only "upon petition of the Attorney General of 
the J]nited States or, in a case involving a labor agree-
mf'nt, upon petition of any employee affected" by the 
agreement. 45 U. S. C. ~ o47 (a) . There, as here, the 
plaintiff~respondent argued that statutory authorization 
for one type of uction agamst the congressionally created 
corporation did not preclude another at the instance of 
the intended beneficiaries of the law. 
The Court's analysis of the claim in Arntrak bega,n 
w1th the observation that express statutory provision for 
one form of proceeding ordinarily implies that no other 
means of enforcement was mtended by the legislature. 
That unplicat1on would yield , however, to "clear contrary 
' ________.. 
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evidence of legislative intent," for which we turned to 
the legislative history and the overall structure of the 
Amtrak Act. 
Inspection revealed that the legislative history of the 
Amtrak Act was entirely consonant with the impl~cation 
of the statutory language that no private right of action 
was intended.1 The general strructure and pUrpose of 
the Act, gave further support to that conclusion. Con-
gress pad expected that, in preating an ~conomically vi-
able rail passenger system, some rail service would have 
to be 'discontinued by Amtrak; it had provided an effi-
cient and expeditious means to that end, whi~h seemed 
incompatiple with an intent to al~ow a private action by 
any passenger affected by a discontinuance 'decision.2 
Nor would the absence of a private right of action leave 
Amtrak free to disregard the public interest in its de-
cisionmaking. In addition to mvcsting the Attorney 
General with "authority to police the Amtrak system 
and to enforce the various duties and obligations imposed 
by the Act" by court action, Congress provided for "sub-
stantial scrutiny" over Amtrak's operations by requiring 
lt to make periodic reports to Congress and the President 
and to open its ' books to th~ Comptroller General for 
auditing. 414 U. S., at 464" 
1 Both the Secretary of Tran::,portation, who was given primj.. ~ 
responsibihty for implementmg the law, and spokesmen for orga,. 
nized labor had interpreted the bJIJ at; rnac~to precludf' privat \" 
act iOns other than tho~e spPcificully authonzed. The drafting sub· 
committee to which the~e v1ews had been exprPssed found nothing 
in thf'm to correct 
z See 414 U S, aL 462· 
' lL how<>vf'r, [the Act] werr tO b..• interpreted as permitting private 
lawsmts to prevent the d1srontinuance of pas~>enger trams, thrn the 
on!) effect of the Act m tlu<' rt'gard would have been to subst1tute 
the federal dist rict courts for thr ;;tate or federal 11dministrahve 
llodJe:-; formerly reqmred to pa~s upon p,roposed discontinuance!l."' 
.. 
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The similarities between the present case and Amtrak l 
are undeniable and for the respondent, we think, insur~ 
mountable. As with Amtrak, so with SIPC, Congress 
has created a corporate entity to solve a public problem; 
it has providf'd for substantial supervision of it.s opera .. 
tious by an agency charged with protection of the public 
interest-here th~ SEC--and for enforcement by that 
agency in court of the obligatiOns imposed upon the 
corporatwn. The corporation is required to report to 
Congress and the President, and to open its books and 
records to the SEC and the Comptroller General. Fur-
ther, Congress has chartered SIPC, unlike Amtrak, as a 
nonproilt corporation, and it has put its direction in the 
hands of a publicly chm·en board of directors. 
Beyond the inference to be drawn from the structure 
of SIPC, there is no extrinsic evidence that Congress in-
tended to allow an action such as that before us.3 As 
the respondent concedes, there 1s no indication in the 
legislative history of the SIPA that Congress ever con-
templated a private nght of actwn parallel to that ex-
pressly given to the SEC. Additionally, as in Amtrak, it 
is clear that the overall structurf' and purpose of the 
s Re&pondent argut>S that lweau~f' Congres& provided that SIPC 
can "sue and be sued, complain and defend, in 1ts corporate name 
und through it;; own counsel m an~ court, State, or Federal," 15 
U. S. C. § 78ccc (b) (1), it must llavP contemplated occaswns when 
f\11 aggrieved customer of a member firm would be able to sue. In 
light of the spemfic terms of the more releYant section governmg 
~uits to compel SIPC to act for thP benefit of mvestors, that con· 
elusion 1,; unwarranted. It it:- also tncompat1ble with the hm1tation 
of SEC action;:; "lo thE> di~tr~et comt of thP United States in which 
the prmCJpnl office of SIPC 1~ locatl•d" 15 tT 8 C § 78ggg (b) It 
would be anomalous for Congress to have centralized SEC ~nits for· 
t w apparent convemf'nc< of SIPC wh!l<• exposing the corporatiOn to 
">llb~ttmtJvely Identic;.~! ;;tutc hy tllWl<tor~ "m any court, State <J!" 
f"det.1iL" 
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SIPC scheme are incompatible with such an implied 
right. 
Congress' primary purpose in enacting the SIP A and 
creating SIPC wa.s, of course, the protection of investors. 
It does not follow, however, that an implied right of 
action by investors who deem themselves to be in need 
of the Act's protection, is either necessary to or indeed 
capable of furthering that purpose. 
SIPC properly treats an application for the appoint-
ment of a receiver and liquidation of a brokerage :firm 
as a last resort. It maintains an early warning system 
and monitors the affairs of any firm that it is given 
reason to believe may be in danger of failure. Its ex-
perience to date demonstrates that more often than not 
an endangered firm will avoid collapse by infusion of 
new capital or merger with a stronger firm! Even fail-
ing those alternatives, a firm may be able to liquidate 
under the supervision of one of the self-regulatory orga-
nizations, or the District Court, without danger of loss 
to customers. SIPC's policy, therefore, is to defer inter-
vention "until there appear[s] to be no reasonable doubt 
that customers would need the protection of the Act." 
SIPC 1973 Annual Report 7 (1974). By this policy; 
SIPC avoids unnecessarily engendering the costs of pre-
cipitious liquidations-the costs not only of administer-
ing t.he liquidation, but also of customer illiquidity and 
additional loss of confidence in the capital mll-rkets--
without sacrifice of any customer protection that may 
1 Of the 266 finn~ bro,tght to the attention of the SIPC by the 
rxchanges, self-regulatory organizatiOns, and the SEC between the 
Pff<'ctlw date o; the SIP-\. and the end of 1973, only 32 were o;ub-
jt·rted to SIPC liquidatum a.s of December 31, 1973. Sixty-six 
withdrew from the bu~mes~ of carrying customer accounts, 26 self-
liquidated and 20 became mactive without cu~tomer loss, 11 merged 
with other firms, 62 corrected thrir problems, and 49 remained under 
:-;•trVPillancr SIPC 1973 Annual Report. 17. 
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ultimately prove necessary. A customer, by contrast, 
cannot be expected to consider, or have adequate infor~ 
mation to consider. these public interests in timing his 
decision to apply to the courts. 
The respondent in this case does not, of course, claim 
any right to make the dflcision that a firm should be 
liquidated; the Act makes that a judicial decision. He 
seeks only the right to ask the District Court to make 
that decision when both SIPC and the SEC have refused 
or simply failed to do so. In practical effect, however, 
the difference is slight. Except with respect to the sol-
idest of houses, the mere filing of an action predicated 
upon allegations of financial insecurity might often prove 
fatal.~ Other customers could not be expected to leave 
their cash and ~ecurities on deposit, nor other brokers 
to initiate new transactions that the firm might not be 
able to cover when due if a receiver is appointed, nor 
would suppliers be likely to continue dealing with such 
a firm . These consequences are too grave, and when 
unnecessary, too inimical to the purposes of the Act, for 
the Court to impute to Congress an intent to grant to 
c: ---..-"( 
every member of the mvestin., public control over their 
occurrence. n t e contrary, t ey seem to be the very 
sorts J considerations that motivated Congress to put 
SIPC in the hands of a public board of directors. respon-
.:~ SC:'e Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 Bus. Law. 891, 897 
(1907) : "ThC:' mom<'nt you brmg a pubhc proceeding again~t a 
broker-deal<>r who depends UIJO!I confidence in his reputation, he is 
to all mtents and purposes out of business." See ~ources collected 
at Freeman, Summary Action b) Admirn~trative Agencies, 40 U. 
Chi. L. Rev 1, 33 n . 162 (1972) , and Gellhorn, Adver& Publicity 
by Admimstratwe Agenc1es, 86 Harv L. Rev. 1380 1394-1397 
(1973) . There may, of cour~e, be less rea$on for public reaction t,o 
t private, as opposf'd to SEC, smt to compel SIPC's protective-
measures, but there 1:,; little reason to think that the investing pub-
lie~ with itt< n~sels at risk, would lw interested iu the distiuct.wn. 
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sible to an agency experienced in regulation of the securi~ 
ties markets.~ 
We need not pause long over the distinctions between 
this case and those, such as J I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 
U. S. 426 (1964), and Allen v Board of Elect?:ons, 393 
U. S. 544 (1969), in which the Court held that an im~ 
plied private cause of actwu was maintainable. 
In J. I. Case a stockholder sought damages against his 
corporation for its alleged misrepresentations, violative 
of § 14 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in 
soliciting proxy votes for the approval of a merger. In 
light of the "broad remedial pm:poses" of the Act and 
the SEC's representation that private enforcement was 
·necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act, the Court 
held that the action for damages could be maintained. 
ThE' Court first concluded that it was "clear that pri-
vate parties have a right under § 27 [of the Act] to bring 
suit for violation of § 14 (a)," since § 27 specifically 
granted the district courts jurisdiction oyer "all suits in 
equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability 
or duty created" under the Act. 377 U. S., at 431. The 
more difficult question was whether the private parties, 
oncfJ in court, could seek damages as well as equitable 
relief. On this point, the Court agreed with the SEC 
that private enforcement of the proxy rules was a neces-
sary supplement to SEC enforcement. Since there wag 
6 The ~equence of events giving rise to this case provided no 
opportnmty for a run on Guaranty because the attempt to compel 
SIPC's interventiOn occurred after the firm had ceased doing busi-
ness and come within the jumdiction of thP D1stnct Court for liqui~ 
dation, at. the in~tance of the SEC.. In these limited circumstances 
Congre~~ cottld n·asonably 1mvt provider! for a private action by 
a rereivPr againHt RIPC, bnt It <hd not and we are not at liberty 
to do so There 1s, after <Ill, a real d1fierence between a comt,'s 
:implymg a nght of action to efieetuatr the purpo:st:'S of a ~tatutt! 
:111d it~ cutting a code of procedure nul of whole c).otlhl, 
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no contrary indicatiou from Congress. the Court so held, 
relying on the statement from Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 
678, 684 (1946), that "where legal rigpts have been in-
vaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right 
to sue for such invasion. federal courts may use any 
available remedy to make gpod the wrol1g done.'' 
Unlike the Securities Exchange Act, the S1PA contains 
no standards of conduet that a private action could help 
to enforee, and 1t contams no general grant of .iurisdie-
tion to the district courts. As in Amtrak, 'a private right 
of actwn under the Act would be consistent neither with 
the legislative intent, nor with the effectuation of the 
purposes it is intended to serve. 
The Allen case arose under the Voting Rights Act of 
1965. The question there was whether a private citizen 
could sue to set aside a state or local election law on the 
ground of its repugnancy to the Act. The federal statute 
provided that the Attorney General may bring such suits, 
but was silent as to the rights of others. It was clear 
to the Court--itnd to the Attorney General-that the 
Act would be practically unenforceable against the many 
local governments sub:1ect to its strictures if only the 
Attorney General were authorized to sue. We thus found 
it "consistent w1th the broad purpose of the Act to allow 
the individual citizen standing to insure that his mty or 
county government complies with~' its requirements. 
393 U. S., at 557" 
There is not the shghtest reason to think that the 
SIP A, in contrast to the Votmg Rights Act, imposes such 
burdens on the parties charged with its administration 
that Congress must either have mtended their efforts to 
be supplemented by those of private investors or enacted 
a statute incapable of achieving its purpose. Instead of' 
enhsting the aid of mvestors Ill achieving that purpose, 
Congress impQsed upon the SEC, the exchange and the 
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self-regulatory organizations the obligation to report to 
SIPC any situatiOn that might call for its intervention, 
For these rf'asons we are unable to agree with the 
propositiOn that the customers of a member broker ma.y 
sue to compel SIPC to perform its statutory fu:hctions.7 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and 
the case is remanded to the District Cour( with instruc-
tions that it be dismissed, 
It is so ordered. 
'The SIDC Rnggests iu it~ brief that u. detem1ination by it not 
io proce!'d againHt SIPC w1th re~pH·t to a member broker-deale~· 
who~e eu;;tomel'8 hnvr incmred a lo~'' of the type against which the 
~IPA 1~ d1rectrrl nugh1 be rl'viewable undet the Admini.strativt~ 
Proc1:dnrr- Act. for an abuse of rliserehou We need express oo 
opm1Ctn on that m~rttr•r toru1y. 
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